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Abstract:
There are many topics that are needed to be analyzed and, at the same time, the answers
of respondents can not be public. Collecting sensitive data requires applying privacy-
preserving security measures. This master’s thesis describes the design and business
processes of the prototype of a secure survey system using secure multi-party computa-
tion. The business processes of the system are introduced using activity diagrams, the
use cases and the state machine diagram. The design of the system is also described
in this paper and is illustrated with a deployment model. Based on the analysis, the
prototype has been implemented and the system will be used to conduct real surveys in
the near future.
Keywords: secure multi-party computation, survey system, confidentiality of data
Privaatsust säilitava küsitlussüsteemi analüüs ja disain
Lühikokkuvõte:
Vajadus konfidentsiaalseid andmeid koguda ja analüüsida nõuab privaatsust säilitavate
turvameetmete kasutusele võtmist. Käesolev magistritöö kirjeldab privaatsust säilitava,
turvalisel ühisarvutusel põhineva küsitlussüsteemi prototüübi analüüsi ning disaini. Süs-
teemi äriprotsesside kirjeldamiseks on kasutatud tegevusskeeme, kasutuslugusid ning oleku-
masina skeemi. Lisaks kirjeldab töö süsteemi ülesehitust ning esitleb juurutusskeem.
Prototüüp on realiseeritud töös kirjeldatud analüüsi põhjal ning süsteemi on lähitulevikus
plaanis kasutada ka praktiliste küsitluste läbiviimiseks.
Võtmesõnad: turvaline ühisarvutus, küsitlussüsteem, andmete konfidentsiaalsus
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1 Introduction
A survey is a method for collecting information from a sample of individuals representing
themselves or some organization. It is a study where data is collected by asking peo-
ple questions. The same questionnaire is distributed to each respondent, data will be
collected and later analyzed. Organizer is a person who represents himself or some orga-
nization and has decided to create a survey to collect data from respondents. Respondent
is a person who represents himself or some organization and has decided to participate
in a survey.
A sample is referring to a group of people who are selected from the population to take
part of the survey. There are many different possibilities to gather the sample. The
type of the sample depends on what is the target group of the survey and what kind of
respondents are expected to answer the questions. Respondents of the survey might be
chosen randomly (random sampling or volunteer sampling) or, for example, regarding the
fact that they might be living in a particular area (cluster sampling) or be users of some
service or product (purposive sampling). Respondents also might be gathered amongst
people working on some particular field (purposive sampling) or the sample might be
created as a national representative (stratified sampling).
There can be a variety of purposes for conducting survey research. Surveys are a simple
way for getting feedback from customers about some services or products (customer sat-
isfaction survey), discovering customers’ expectations (market research survey), making
better political (political satisfaction survey) or marketing decisions (market research sur-
vey), for succeeding in innovative production (market research survey), gathering statis-
tics (statistical survey), measuring employee satisfaction (employee satisfaction survey),
being able to predict the behaviour of voters (political satisfaction survey) or for gather-
ing any kind of opinion or reaction from the respondents (event planning survey, student
satisfaction survey, patient survey, etc).
There are many topics that are needed to be analyzed but at the same time, the answers
of respondents can not be public. The data of the surveys that collect information about
personal health or personal income or any other surveys that require revealing personal
information of a respondent must be kept private and not disclosed to any third parties.
It is crucial that the initial answers of a respondent will not be seen by anyone else but
himself and no confidential information can be learned from the stored data. This re-
quires applying privacy-preserving security measures.
Privacy-preserving computation and survey technologies are also a useful tool in cyber-
and physical defence. For example, it could be used to improve collaborations within
in coalitions and defence organizations, such as NATO (North-Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion) and EDA (European Defence Agency). Consider the following example. If members
of the EDA were to exchange information on the kind of cyber attack patterns they are
witnessing in their systems, it could help bolster the response mechanisms in the coalition.
However, information about which attacks target which countries can leak information
about the defensive weaknesses of the said country, making the related information highly
confidential. Secure data collection technology, such as the privacy-preserving survey sys-
tem described in this thesis, can help improve such collaborations.
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The aim of this master’s thesis is to describe the design and business processes of the
prototype of the secure survey system using secure multi-party computation which en-
ables survey organizer to collect sensitive data without causing harm to participants by
disclosing their answers. The main workflows that are required to function correctly and
securely in this prototype are the transfer of data from the input party to the computing
parties, secure multi-party computation protocols and the transfer of results from com-
puting parties to the result party.
The business processes are modelled using Unifed Modelling Language (UML). The reason
for choosing UML as a modelling language is to analyze whether designing the business
processes of the applications that are based on secure multi-party computation affect
the system analysis methods that are used in an IT-company that applies UML in its
development process.
Authors contribution in this work was to analyze the business processes of the secure
survey system and to cooperate with developers from Cybernetica AS and Partisia in
the PRACTICE EU FP7 project for finding the best set of the processes that should be
included in the prototype. The author has modelled all processes of the prototype as
activity diagrams as well as the state machine diagram. Also, she has written the use
cases that describe the functionality in more detail and supported the implementation
of the prototype by testing the functionality. Additionally, the author participated in
writing the supplementary report [25] of the secure survey system for the final review.
In addition to the secure survey prototype, the author of this thesis has an experience in
analyzing the business processes of another prototype that is based on secure multi-party
computation – the prototype of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board (MTA) value-
added tax (VAT) fraud detection system. The author analyzed the business processes
of the system and is the co-author of the research report of Cybernetica [15] and the
article published in Financial Cryptography [16]. Based on the experience, the author
introduces the key differences in the deployment of SMC-based software compared to the
usual solution.
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2 Privacy in online surveys
This section describes the main steps of the survey process, different types of surveys
and the issues with privacy when conducting a survey. Finally, the privacy guarantees of
existing online survey platforms are described.
2.1 General survey process
Surveys are conducted by an organizer – the person or organization who wants to collect
the data. The organizer can also contract a research or data collection organization that
conducts the survey. When a service provider is used, this organization collects the data
on client’s behalf and provides final results to the client. Usually, the analysis of data
will be conducted by the organizer of the survey, but there is also a possibility to use the
services of an organization that is specialized on data analysis (see Figure 2).
Based on [19, 29, 23] and on author’s knowledge from previous work experience in the
field of data collection and analysis, the process of survey generally consists of eight steps
(see Figure 1).
1. Plan. The most important phase of conducting a survey is planning. This is also
the phase where hypotheses are set. The quality of planning will define whether the
research will be successful or not, whether the data will be high-quality or not. To
produce good analysis at the end, it is inevitable to plan the structure of a survey
and method of sampling according to the goals determined and the final use of the
results. The response rate of the survey is highly related to the design of the survey.
The respondent must be motivated to answer the questions. The instructions, as
well as question texts, must be clearly understandable. Also, completing the survey
must not take unnecessarily long time.
Result: Initial questionnaire in written form (ready for testing or ready for pro-
gramming) and sample.
2. Design. In the case of online surveys or computer-assisted telephone interviews
it is needed to program the questionnaire. In this phase, the questionnaire will
be programmed by the organizer or the conducting organization. This phase can
be skipped, if there is no need to program the questionnaire. For example, if a
chosen survey will be conducted by using face-to-face interviews, making telephone
interviews or gathering focus groups without the use of computers.
Result: The first version of the programmed questionnaire.
3. Test. In order to avoid any problems while running the survey, it is important to
always have a testing phase before the launch. While testing, it is also possible
to find out the estimated time for completing the questionnaire, detect possibly
problematic questions, etc. Testing should be done with a small group of possible
respondents to find out if everything is understandable and to find out the actual
time used to complete the survey.
Result: Final version of the survey that can be used in a live deployment.
4. Run. Running the survey is the phase where the actual data is collected. Depend-
ing on the survey method, it is the period when interviewers will call respondents,
meet the respondents at their homes or in public places or the period while the
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online survey will be active.
Result: Answers from respondents.
5. Prepare data. The data has to be cleaned and prepared for analyzing. For
example, if data was collected on paper, but the answers will be analyzed digitally,
an organizer or conducting organization has to insert the answers manually into a
digital database. If the survey was made online, data might have to be exported
and transformed into the requisite format.
Result: Cleaned data that is ready for analysis.
6. Analyze. In this stage, collected and prepared data will be analyzed, whether
digitally or manually.
Result: Tables and charts representing the analyzed data.
7. Report. When data is analyzed, it is time to report the results. The report should
include conclusions made based on the analysis and be clearly understandable for
the target group.
Result: Usually a report in digital form based on the analysis including tables and
charts of the analyzed data and concluding notes.
8. Act. When the survey is completed – data is analyzed and reported – it is time
to compare the results with the hypotheses set in the planning phase and use the
results for the objectives stated. The organizer will use the results of the survey for
making better marketing decisions, changing services according to the opinion of the
respondents, using statistical information to predict the behaviour of a customer,
etc.
Result: Actions taken, changes applied, etc.
Plan Design Test Run
Prepare
dataAnalyzeReportAct
Figure 1: General survey process
Actors that can be responsible for the processes of administering different stages of the
survey are organizer, conducting organization and/or analyzing organization. The asso-
ciations of processes and actors can be seen on Figure 2.
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Organizer Conducting organization Analyzing organization
Plan Design
Design
Test
Run
Prepare data Analyze
Analyze
Test
Run
Prepare data
Report
ReportAct
Analyze
Report
Who will analyze
the data?
Who will conduct
the survey?
Figure 2: The activity diagram of survey process
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2.2 Survey technologies
There are many different possibilities for data collection. The most popular methods are
following.
1. Face-to-face interviews – Interviewing the respondent face-to-face either in his/her
home or in a public place.
2. Telephone interviews – Interviewing the respondent over the phone.
3. Online surveys – Conducting surveys online.
4. Focus groups – Gathering respondents in one room and asking them questions
while observers examine their reactions.
5. Paper surveys – Collecting the answers for a survey on a paper, sending ques-
tionnaires either by mail or, for example, handing them out in a supermarket.
The best method for a survey depends on a topic, target group, structure, question types,
length of a survey, etc. See Table 1.
Type of sur-
vey
Suitable for Unsuitable for Relative cost
Face-to-face
survey
Long interviews. Inter-
views that might need
additional instructions.
Short period surveys.
Surveys that require
revealing sensitive
data.
Expensive
Telephone
survey
Medium time interviews.
Interviews that might
need additional instruc-
tions or encouragement
for answering the survey.
Long interviews. Sur-
veys that require re-
vealing sensitive data.
Medium cost
Online survey Short time to long time
interviews. Surveys that
require revealing sensi-
tive data.
Research that requires
answers from respon-
dents who possibly
might not have access
to the internet.
Low cost
Focus group Medium time to long
time interviews. Inter-
views that require ob-
servation of the respon-
dent’s reaction.
Research that requires
answers from respon-
dents from a wide ge-
ographical area. Sur-
veys that require re-
vealing sensitive data.
Medium cost
Paper survey Medium time to long
time interviews.
Short period surveys. Low cost
Table 1: The comparison of different survey types
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2.3 Privacy in surveys
Surveys may be conducted practically in every field. The research fields of surveys include
salary surveys to collect data about labor market, employee satisfaction surveys, mar-
ket research surveys, health and medical care surveys, psychological surveys, scientific
surveys, government surveys. Surveys about transportation, politics, legislation, media,
education, economy, religious beliefs, etc are also common.
The main concerns for respondents is usually their anonymity and the confidentiality of
collected data. Perceptions of privacy may be the most influential factor in a respondent’s
decision whether to participate in a survey or to give truthful answers. Respondents must
be assured, that the survey is legitimate and their personal data will be protected.
2.3.1 Legislation
Data protection legislation is concerned with the processing of personal data and applies
to anyone involved in the collection, processing and use of market research data – the
organizer, conducting organization and analyzing organization. For example, according
to the the European Union Personal Data Protection Act [6], personal data can only be
processed (e.g. collected and further used) if the data subject has unambiguously given
his consent. Researchers must take into account all state, federal and international regu-
lations. As surveys may often be international and the regulations may differ in every
state, it is important to know and apply the regulations separately in every state the
survey will be conducted in, not just in the state the survey is created.
For example, the Estonian Personal Data Protection Act defines personal data as follows
”Personal data is any data concerning an identified or identifiable natural person, regard-
less of the form or format in which such data exist” [6]. In addition, the Act also defines
sensitive personal data as:
1) data revealing political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs, except data re-
lating to being a member of a legal person in private law registered pursuant to the
procedure provided by law;
2) data revealing ethnic or racial origin;
3) data on the state of health or disability;
4) data on genetic information;
5) biometric data (above all fingerprints, palm prints, eye iris images and genetic data);
6) information on sex life;
7) information on trade union membership;
8) information concerning commission of an offense or falling victim to an offense before
a public court hearing, or making of a decision in the matter of the offense or
termination of the court proceeding in the matter.
Similarly, the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data [1], Article 8 states that Member States shall prohibit
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious
or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of data concerning
health or sex life unless the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing
of those data. In some fields, e.g. in clinical trials, it is required that the respondent
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must sign a separate informed consent form.
Moreover, Article 17 of the Convention states that Member States shall provide that the
controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect
personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration,
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the trans-
mission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of processing.
To be able to transfer data from the European Union to the United States, for example,
while conducting international surveys, a researcher must adhere to the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor framework for collecting data from EU [3] principles which regulate the collec-
tion, use and retention of personal information from EU member countries. The U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor Framework [4] provides guidance for U.S. organizations on how to provide
adequate protection for personal data from the EU as required by the European Union’s
Directive on Data Protection.
In case the purpose of conducting a survey is to collect personal health information in
U.S., compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [2] of
1996 (HIPAA) is required. HIPAA provides for the protection of individually identifiable
health information that is transmitted or maintained in any form or medium. The privacy
rules affect the day-to-day business operations of all organizations that provide medical
care and maintain personal health information.
2.3.2 Self-regulation and standards
In addition to regulations, there are also ethical rules and other good practices that can
convince the respondent about confidentiality of his responses, e.g. CASRO Code of
Standards and Ethics for Survey Research [13]. CASRO (The Council of American Sur-
vey Research Organizations) is the national association established in 1975 to represent
the U.S. research industry and those organizations engaged in the conduct, support, or
education of market, opinion, and social research, often described as data analytics, con-
sumer insights, or business intelligence [13].
An example of good practices according to SurveyMonkey [31]: ”It is always good to
disclose your privacy practices to your respondents. Doing this helps to increase response
rates by putting potential respondents more at ease.” According to SurveyMonkey, the
privacy policy should include information about the personal information that will be
collected, information about how the responses will be used, information about whether
responses will be accessible for third parties and contact information.
Moreover, there is an international standard that provides a high-level framework for
the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) within information and com-
munication technology (ICT) systems – ISO/IEC 29100:2011 [7]. It is intended to help
organizations define their privacy safeguarding requirements related to PII within an ICT
environment by referencing following principles:
1. Consent and choice – provide PII principal with the opportunity to choose how
their PII is handled and allow a PII principal to withdraw consent. Also PII prin-
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cipal possibility to give a consent in relation to the processing of their PII at the
time of collection, first use or as soon as practicable thereafter.
2. Purpose legitimacy and specification – ensure that the purpose(s) comply with
applicable law, inform PII principal about the purpose(s) before the information is
collected or used for the first time for a new purpose in a clearly understandable
way.
3. Collection limitation – limit the collection of PII to that which is within the
boudns of applicable law and strictly necessary for the specified purpose(s).
4. Data minimization – minimize the PII which is processed and the number of
privacy stakeholders and people to whom PII is disclosed or who have access to
it.Delete and dispose PII whenever the purpose for PII processing has expired or
there are no legal requirements to keep the PII.
5. Use, retention and disclosure limitation – limit the use, retention and disclo-
sure (including transfer) of PII to that which is necessary in order to fulfil specific,
explicit and legitimate purposes. Retain PII only as long as necessary to fulfil the
stated purposes, and thereafter securely destroy or anonymize it.
6. Accuracy and quality – ensure that the PII processed is accurate, complete, up-
to-date, adequate and relevant for the purpose of use. Ensure the reliability of PII
collected from a source other than from the PII principal before it is processed.
7. Openness, transparency and notice – provide PII principals with clear and
easily accessible information about the PII controller’s policies, procedures and
practices with respect to the processing of PII.Notice PII principals about the fact
that PII is being processed, the purpose for which this is done, the types of pri-
vacy stakeholders to whom the PII might be disclosed and the identity of the PII
controller. Give notice to PII principals when major changes in the PII handling
procedures occur.
8. Individual participation and access – give PII principals the ability to access
and review their PII. Allow PII principals to challenge the accuracy and complete-
ness of the PII and have it amended, corrected or removed if requested.
9. Accountability – document and communicate as appropriate all privacy-related
policies, procedures and practices. Assign to a specified individual within the or-
ganization the task of implementing the privacy-related policies, procedures and
practices. Provide suitable training for the personnel of the PII controller who will
have access to PII. Measures to remediate a privacy breach should be proportionate
to the risks associated with the breach but they should be implemented as quickly
as possible.
10. Information security – protect PII under its authority with appropriate controls
at the operational, functional and strategit level to ensure the integrity, confiden-
tiality and availability of the PII, and protect it against risk such as unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification, disclosure and loss throughout the whole of
its life cycle. Limit access to those individuals who require access to perform their
duties.
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11. Privacy compliance – Verify and demonstrate that the processing meets data
protection and privacy safeguarding requirements by periodically conducting au-
dits using internal auditors or trusted third-party auditors. Develop and maintain
privacy risk assessments, have appropriate internal controls and independent super-
vision mechanisms in place that assure compliance with relevant privacy law and
wuith their security, data protection and privacy policies and procedures.
2.4 Online surveys
For conducting an online survey it is possible to choose amongst several possible survey
building tools, that can be divided into three levels.
The first level includes free online tools (like Google Forms1 and LimeSurvey2) which
include the basic functionality needed to create a simple questionnaire. These tools are
the best option for people who rarely conduct a survey or do not have any special re-
quirements for the questionnaire.
The second level includes online survey tools that offer basic functionality for free, but
users have a possibility to get many additional features if they pay for them (tools like
SurveyGizmo3 and QuestionPro4). Free versions of these tools are the best option for
people who also rarely conduct a survey or do not have any special requirements for the
questionnaire. Free or paid versions of these tools are a great choice for scientists, smaller
organizations or freelancers, who might have higher requirements for questionnaire or
who might conduct surveys more regularly.
The third level includes tools not free of charge (for example Confirmit5 and Quretec6).
These are usually advanced systems where users are also able to include more complex
programming logic to manage the conduction of a questionnaire and many other advanced
features. Tools not free of charge are mostly used by organizations that are specialized
to market research or any kind of data collection and which need advanced techniques
for building questionnaires and analyzing the data.
2.4.1 Online survey techniques
Depending on the technique, online surveys can be additionally divided into subcategories.
There are different possibilities for conducting an online survey, for example e-mail sur-
veys, mobile surveys, on-site polls and panels.
E-mail surveys – Allows to send invitations to participants by e-mail. This is the most
popular choice when conducting a survey that is directed to certain target group. This
is also, a good choice if the questionnaire is quite long and time consuming. Some of the
1Google Forms, https://www.google.com/forms/about/
2LimeSurvey, https://www.limesurvey.org/
3SurveyGizmo, http://www.surveygizmo.com/
4QuestionPro, http://www.questionpro.com/
5Confirmit, http://www.confirmit.com/
6Quretec, http://www.quretec.com/
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online tools that provide this functionality are QuestionPro, Google Forms and FreeOn-
lineSurvey.
Mobile apps – Allows to get a higher response rate due to the flexibility offered to
the respondents. In addition, these apps enable to collect information like geolocation,
camera, audio/video recording, etc, due to mobile devices’ capacity. Data is collected
and treated in real time. The respondent does not have to be by the computer, but can
fill the questionnaire practically anywhere. Online tools that provide this functionality
are, for example, Qualtricks, FluidSurveys and SurveyMonkey.
On-site poll widgets – Allows the organizer to embed the poll on his website, to ask
site visitors about their opinions, such as whether they favour or oppose a new policy
or who they think is likely to win an upcoming election. These polls typically ask site
visitors about their opinions and are usually attractive features for news sites. Tools that
can be used for creating on-site poll widgets are, for example, EasyPolls, PollMaker and
PollSnack.
Panels – Allows respondents to take voluntarily part of the surveys. Respondents can
join an online research and data collection panels, where they can collect bonus points or
money as a reward for completing the survey. Respondents have possibility to fill initial
questionnaire and based on the answers get regular invitations to surveys with suitable
target group. Online tools that provide this functionality are, for example, iPoll, i-Say
and MySurvey.
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3 Secure multi-party computation
This section describes secure multi-party computation (SMC). In more detail, it describes
what is SMC and how it helps to preserve the privacy of data. This section also gives
some examples of practical SMC applications.
3.1 Overview
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a cryptographic technology for computing a
function with multiple parties where all parties know their own input value and can learn
the final output value but are not able to see each other’s inputs. For example, if a num-
ber of parties P1, ...,Pn, who initially hold inputs x1, ..., xn, wish to compute the value of
a function f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) = (y1, y2, y3, ..., yn), then every party P i can only learn the
value of yi. It allows to process private data without compromising anyone’s privacy.
One of the most popular example of the necessity of using SMC in real life is the millio-
naires’ problem introduced by Andrew C. Yao [12] where two millionaires wish to know
who is richer. However, they do not want to reveal any additional information about
each other’s wealth. For example, person P i knows the value of xi and no other input
values. The millionaires’ problem corresponds to the case when n = 2 and f(x1, x2) = 1
if x1 < x2 and 0 otherwise.
There are a number of possibilities for implementing SMC. In our secure survey prototype
we use SMC based on secret sharing technology. Secret sharing was introduced by Adi
Shamir in [11] and George Blakley in [21]. In secret sharing, a secret value s is split into
a number of shares (s1, s2, s3, ..., sn) and the shares are distributed to different instances.
Each share looks random to the holder and a predetermined number of shares is needed
to reconstruct the value.
Conducting a survey that requires respondents revealing sensitive data is one of the many
fields that would benefit from the use of SMC, so we took this opportunity to implement
a practical SMC survey application prototype.
3.2 Examples of practical SMC applications
This subsection briefly introduces some examples of implemented practical SMC appli-
cations.
3.2.1 Danish sugar beet auction
One of the first practical secure multi-party application experiments, the Danish sugar
beet auction, was reported in 2008 [24]. In Denmark, several thousand farmers produce
sugar beets, which are sold to the company Danisco, the only sugar beets processor on
the Danish market. When the EU drastically reduced the support for sugar beet pro-
duction there was an urgent need to reallocate contracts to farmers whose productions
are the most beneficial. This was best done via a nation-wide exchange, a double auction.
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To satisfy all parties, the actual bids had to be hidden from others. It would not have
been acceptable for farmers if, for example, Danisco would have acted as the only auc-
tioneer. Therefore, the solution was to implement an electronic double auction using
three-party multi-party computation, where computing parties were Danisco, DKS and
the SIMAP project.
In the system, a web server was set up for receiving bids, and three servers were set up for
doing the secure computation. To submit the data, every participant had to download
the program to their computer together with the public keys of the computation servers.
The secret shares were not actually sent directly from the computers to the computing
nodes. Each share was first encrypted with a public key of one of the nodes and then
stored in a database by the web server. After that, the representative for each of the
involved parties triggered the computation by inserting his USB stick, where the private
key material was stored, and entering his password on his own machine. For the technical
description of the sugar beet auction see [20].
3.2.2 SMC application for financial data analysis
Another practical application that uses SMC is the prototype reporting system for a con-
sortium of ICT companies (Estonian Association of Information Technology and Telecom-
munications – ITL) for collecting financial data twice a year to analyze the economic
situation of an industrial sector [18]. The application has been already used several times
for collecting financial information. To eliminate the fact that the collected data would
be accessible for the board of ITL as this might reduce the number of companies that
agree to submit their data, the application was built on Sharemind [14] secure compu-
tation framework as the data needed for analysis is highly confidential and must not be
disclosed. This is the first application which was used to make SMC computation on real
data over the internet with computing nodes spread geographically apart.
The companies hosting the three computing nodes were chosen amongst the ITL con-
sortium (Cybernetica, Microlink and Zone Media), so they would have no intention to
collude as they are also submitting their own private data in the system and want to en-
sure the privacy of their data. The data was submitted through an online submission form
that was integrated into ITL webpage. Submitted data was secret-shared at the source
and distributed among the three computing parties. After the deadline, the computing
parties engaged in SMC protocols and collected all economic indicators independently.
Then the indicators were published to the board of ITL as a spreadsheet that did not
include any identifying information.
Together with the second collection period, there was also a simple feedback survey
conducted among the members of the consortium, asking them about the motivation and
possible privacy issues of participating in this data collection system. The results showed
that about a half of the participants submitted their data only because they felt that the
system is preserving their privacy.
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3.2.3 Employee satisfaction survey
Cybernetica AS in Estonia has been using SMC application for conducting employee
satisfaction survey for the past two years. This is another great example of a SMC ap-
plication successfully used in real life, as the use of this application was successful both
times. This application was also built on Sharemind [14] secure computation framework
as the answers of employees must not be disclosed to third parties. Three computing par-
ties were chosen amongst employees, as they would have no intention to collude as they
are also submitting their own private data in the system and want to ensure the privacy
of their data.
The data was submitted through online submission form and the secret shares of respon-
dents’ answers were stored in three different computers acting as computing nodes. After
the deadline, the computing parties engaged in SMC protocols and data was aggregated.
The aggregated data was published to the data collector without any identifying infor-
mation.
3.3 Shortcomings of the state-of-the-art
This section describes the shortcomings of the existing online survey tools and imple-
mented practical SMC survey tools.
The applications described in Section 2.4.2 put the users in position where they need to
trust the one enterprise which controls the server(s) where the data is stored. Even if the
privacy policy states that the data is securely stored and sensitive data can not be studied
by third parties, it might not be enough to convince the user to trust the organization.
This, however, may influence the response rate of the survey.
These applications also give the organizer the possibility to analyze the whole dataset
of the initial answers by giving him/her direct access to the data. This means that it
could be possible for organizer to recognize the respondent based on his/her answers if,
for example, employee satisfaction survey is conducted. For example, if organizer has the
information about the department, gender and position of a respondent, he/she can iden-
tify the person and with that know how that specific person answered to all the questions.
The applications described in Subsection 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 give user more confidence about
privacy-preserving data storage. Even though these tools were successfully used in prac-
tice, there are some disadvantages regarding to these systems. First of all, the structure
of the questionnaire is fixed. This means that the organizer of the survey can not build up
complex questionnaires. The survey conducted using these systems must be very simple.
Secondly, the business processes of these systems are not analyzed thoroughly from the
organizer’s point of view. Therefore, the final reports’ structure is fixed and very sim-
ple. Organizer can not choose, neither before activating nor after closing the survey, how
he/she wants the computed data to be presented. Also, to publish the results, organizer
must do it manually – report is not meant to be published directly from the system.
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The secure survey system prototype described in this work, aims to reduce the short-
comings and provide more flexibility. Firstly, comparing to the existing online survey
tools, it provides a new trust model by using secure multi-party computation. Moreover,
the whole dataset of the initial answers will never be public, only computed results will
be displayed to organizer (see Figures 3 and 4). The results can be computed only once
and a minimum of five answers for each question are required.
Secondly, comparing to the implemented SMC applications, it allows the organizer to
create more complex questionnaires and inspect the final results online in various formats.
However, the secure survey prototype does not have as many features as a commercial
survey software. The organizer can also print the report and publish it by sending the
unique link to respondents (this functionality has not been completely implemented in
the prototype by the time of submitting the thesis).
Figure 3: The table view of the report
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Figure 4: The chart view of the report
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4 The secure survey system
The objective of the secure survey system prototype, which has been implemented during
the PRACTICE EU FP7 project by Partisia, Cybernetica AS and Alexandra Institute,
is to enable the survey organizer to collect sensitive data and produce statistics without
causing harm to respondents by allowing third parties (intentionally or unintentionally)
to study their individual answers. It is crucial that the initial answers of respondents
will not be seen by anyone else but themselves and no confidential information can be
learned from the stored data. Therefore, in the prototype, answer data is encrypted.
Data about the survey itself (questions and possible answer options) is not encrypted in
this prototype.
Given that the organizer who collects the data and participant who answers the questions
are typically concerned about the sensitive data collected, it is very important that it can
be clearly communicated through the secure survey system itself that no secret data will
be leaked. In the system, there is a simple description about the privacy preservation
techniques and information about the companies that host the servers. This information
is accessible for all users of the system. When the participant is aware of the security
guarantees of the system, he/she is probably more eager to participate in a survey or to
give truthful answers.
The main workflows that are required to function correctly and securely in this prototype
are the transfer of secret-shared answer data from the input parties (the respondents) to
the computing parties, the engagement process of secure multi-party computation pro-
tocols and the transfer of secret-shared results from computing parties to the result party.
The secure survey system prototype is designed to run on two different secure multi-party
computation engines: Sharemind and Fresco/SPDZ. This master’s thesis concentrates
on the implementation using the Sharemind 3 framework (see Subsection 4.1).
4.1 Sharemind 3
Sharemind [14] is a full framework for developing secure multi-party computation ap-
plications and it can be used for building applications that analyze confidential data in a
way that privacy of the data owners will be preserved. Sharemind is using the additive
secret sharing scheme with three parties connected over secure asynchronous network
channels to preserve the confidentiality of data. This means that every secret value is
split into three pieces called shares and every share is stored in a different server instance
(see Figure 6) as a completely random bit sequence.
For example, if an input party wants to provide a secret value x ∈ Z (where Z is a finite
integer ring) as a private input to n computing parties, it uniformly generates shares
x1, ..., xn-1 ← Z and calculates the final share xn = x − x1 − ... − xn-1. Each computing
party receives one share xi (see Figure 5). As an individual share, xi is just a uniformly
distributed value and no computing party can learn anything about x without colluding
with others. Computing parties can process the shares without recovering the secret.
For example, if each computing party has shares xi and yi of secrets x and y, they can
calculate zi = xi + yi to get the shares of z = x+ y.
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Figure 5: Example of secret-sharing
The secret sharing of secret values is performed at the source and each share is sent to
a different server over a secure channel. This guarantees that no one but data owner
will know the original value. Next, Sharemind server instances engage secure multi-
party computation protocols to compute the results. When results are computed, the
aggregated data will be available for the end user who can reconstruct the values of com-
putation result.
Sharemind includes two different kinds of programs for different parties - server in-
stances run the server software and other parties (data owners and end users) run the
controller software. The server software consists of algorithms and protocols that perform
the multi-party computation and data mining tasks. The controller software is used to
send data and commands to the server instances and handles data encryption and de-
cryption.
To ensure a high level of security, all server instances must be operated by indepen-
dent parties to avoid collusion. Therefore, if shares from one server will be disclosed
to adversary, he can not reconstruct the initial secret values by using only one share of
them. Sharemind secure multi-party computation protocols are secure in the honest-
but-curious model with no more than one passive corrupted party. Working in the passive
model expects more honesty from computing parties, but makes it possible to have consid-
erably faster computations over many other secure MPCs implementations. Sharemind
is also capable of providing security against an active adversary, but with a lower effi-
ciency.
Sharemind is using the high-level programming language SecreC("secrecy") [17] for
developing privacy-preserving data mining algorithms for Sharemind applications. Se-
creC is a C-like language that allows to separate public and private data types. Variables
that are typed as private are processed using secure computation whereas public values
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are stored and processed as usual, this means that confidential data remains protected.
The design of SecreC aims at simplifying the programming task and preventing the
developer from making trivial privacy leaks.
Confidential 
data Result data
Sharemind
server 1
Sharemind
server 2
Sharemind
server 3
Figure 6: The deployment model of Sharemind
4.2 Actors and privacy goals
Actor Description Privacy goals
Organizer A person who represents himself or
some organization and has decided
to create a survey to collect data
from participants.
Wants to ensure (and to be
able to confirm) that partici-
pants’ answer data is kept confi-
dential to collect data about sen-
sitive topics and get higher res-
ponse rate.
Wants to comply with the data
protection laws.
Participant A person who represents himself or
some organization and has decided
to participate in a survey.
Wants that the confidentiality of
his/her private data is guaran-
teed.
The owner
of a com-
puting in-
stance
A person or an organization who
hosts one of three computing in-
stances and, also, is interested in
keeping the data confidential and
has no intention to collude with
other computing instances’ owners.
At the same time, could also be an
organizer or a participant.
Is either taking part of the sur-
vey himself or is interested in the
final results of the survey and,
therefore, is interested in protect-
ing the confidentiality of private
data.
The purpose of secure survey system is to guarantee that the privacy goals of the actors
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described above will be fulfilled. The privacy preservation techniques that are used to
accomplish the level of security that corresponds to the actors’ needs are described in
next subsection.
4.3 Privacy preservation techniques
This subsection highlights the privacy preservation techniques of the secure survey system
that enhance the privacy of the system comparing to the existing online survey tools
described in Section 2.4.2. It also describes how the increased security level is introduced
to the users.
Secret-shared data
The secret sharing of respondents’ answers is performed at the source and each share is
sent to a different server over a secure channel. This guarantees that no one but data
owner will know the original value because each share looks random to the holder and
to reconstruct the initial value all shares are needed. Processing with SMC ensures that
private inputs are not reconstructed even during report preparation. The whole dataset
of the initial answers will never be public, only computed results will be displayed to
organizer.
Distributed system
The survey system is a distributed cloud computing system that does not allow the
individual cloud service provider to access any of confidential information at any time.
Second, the control of the individual cloud service provider instances is distributed among
independent parties, each knowing no more than the individual cloud service provider.
Minimum number of answers
A minimum of five answers for each question are required to analyze a survey and the
results of the survey can only be computed once. Thus, the organizer cannot misuse
the survey system to deduce otherwise confidential answers by comparison of repeatedly
computed reports i.e. by comparing two results with only a single additional answer as
the difference. The number of minimum answers can be modified in future versions of
the system.
Public data checks
The client application is implemented in such a way that it accepts public data and
results of user actions if and only if all the servers return identical results. This way it
is possible to detect when public data is manipulated on any of the servers. If one of
the servers wants to behave in a malicious way and edit the questions displayed to the
user and thus mislead the participant, survey organizer would get inaccurate results for
the survey. The implementation eliminates that risk with checking whether duplicated
public data is identical.
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5 Business processes of the secure survey system
This section presents the activity diagrams, use cases and state machine of the secure
survey system prototype. The activity diagrams introduce the overall picture of func-
tionalities of the survey system. In activity diagrams, the functionalities that are an
important part of the privacy preservation are marked with the yellow color. Use cases
describe activity diagrams in more detail. In the use case diagram, the use cases which
contain the functionality that is important part of the privacy preservation are marked
with the yellow color. Use cases also include the references to the state machine diagram
(see Subsection 5.6). The state machine diagram gives an overview of the states and
functions of the survey system.
The actor ’survey system’ is connected to all use cases by default. The system is always
an involved actor and is not connected to every use case in the use case diagram nor
mentioned in the description of use cases’ involved actors. The system is mentioned as
an involved actor only if it is the only actor of this use case.
UC03: Add question
group
UC11: Deactivate
survey
UC14: See published
report
UC13: Publish/print
report
UC12: Generate a
report
UC10:
Participate
UC09: Close
survey
UC08: Cancel
survey
UC07: View/change
survey parameters
Survey system
UC06: Open
survey
UC05: Activate survey
UC04:
Edit/Remove/Rearrange
question
UC02: Add
question
UC01: Create survey
Participant
Organizer
Figure 7: Survey system use cases
5.1 Design survey
This section describes the survey creation process in Figure 8.
Use cases that are describing this activity diagram:
• UC01: Create survey
• UC02: Add question
• UC03: Add question group
• UC04: Edit/remove/rearrange question(s).
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Organizer
Create new survey Continue editing survey
Add new
question
Remove
question
Edit question
Save survey
design
Rearrange
questions
Add question group
Remove question
group
Edit question group
Survey design saved
Choose
action
Choose
action
Figure 8: Activity diagram for survey design
UC01: Create survey
Brief description: Organizer will create a survey by creating a new blank questionnaire.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has logged in to the survey system.
Trigger: Organizer decided to start creating a new survey. (Function createSurvey)
Postcondition: Organizer has created a survey and the survey is displayed to organizer.
(Survey will have status ’Draft’)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to create a survey.
2. System displays the survey creation form.
3. Organizer inserts a name for the survey and selects creating a new survey.
4. System creates a new survey and displays the created survey to organizer.
Extensions
3a. Organizer cancels creating the survey.
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3a.1. System cancels the process.
UC02: Add question
Brief description: Organizer will add new question to the survey by a choosing question
type, adding question text and the answer list. The updated survey will be displayed to
organizer.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has created a survey and opened it for editing. System has dis-
played the survey. (Survey status is ’Draft’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to add new question to the questionnaire. (Function amendQues-
tionnaire)
Postcondition: Organizer has added question and answer options to the questionnaire and
updated survey is displayed to organizer. (Survey status will not change)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to add a new question.
2. System displays an editable question form.
3. Organizer inserts the question text and a list of answers, chooses the type of the
question and submits the question.
4. System adds the question to the questionnaire and displays updated survey.
Extensions
3a. Organizer inserts the question text and/or answer list and decides to leave the page.
3a.1. System displays a warning about changes not saved.
3a.2. Organizer decides to submit the question.
3a.3. The use case continues from main success scenario step 4.
3b. Organizer inserts the question text and/or answer list and decides to leave the page.
3b.1. System displays warning about changes not saved.
3b.2. Organizer decides to leave the page.
3b.3. System displays the page organizer navigated to.
UC03: Add question group
Brief description: Organizer will add new a question group to the survey. Editable ques-
tion group form will be displayed to the organizer.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has created a survey and opened it for editing. System has dis-
played the survey. (Survey status is ’Draft’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to add new question group to the questionnaire. (Function
amendQuestionnaire)
Postcondition: Organizer has added question group to the questionnaire and editable
question group form is displayed to organizer. (Survey status will not change)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to add a new question group.
2. System displays editable question group form.
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3. Organizer continues with UC02: Add question and/or UC04: Edit/remove/rearrange
question(s).
Extensions
3a. Organizer decides to leave the page.
3a.1. System displays warning about changes not saved.
3a.2. Organizer decides to leave the page.
3a.3. System displays the page organizer navigated to.
UC04: Edit/remove/rearrange question(s)
Brief description: Organizer will edit the question or remove the question from question-
naire or rearrange questions. Updated survey will be displayed to organizer.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: System has displayed the survey. If the organizer wants to edit the ques-
tion or remove the question from the questionnaire, then the questionnaire should include
at least one question. If organizer wants to rearrange questions then the questionnaire
should include at least two questions. (Survey status is ’Draft’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to edit question or remove question from questionnaire or re-
arrange questions. (Function amendQuestionnaire)
Postcondition: Organizer has edited question or removed question from the questionnaire
or rearranged questions. The updated survey is displayed to organizer. (Survey status
will not change)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to edit a question.
2. System presents the editable question form.
3. Organizer changes the question text and/or answer list and submits the question.
4. System saves the changes and displays the updated survey.
Extensions
1a. Organizer chooses to remove a question.
1a.1. System asks for confirmation.
1a.2. Organizer confirms the decision.
1a.3. System removes the question and displays updated survey.
1b. Organizer chooses to rearrange questions and does it by using the drag-and-drop
method.
1b.1. System saves modified questionnaire and displays updated survey.
5.2 Activate survey
This section describes survey activating process in Figure 9.
Use cases that are describing this activity diagram:
• UC05: Activate survey
• UC06: Open survey
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Organizer Survey system
Select survey
Display the list of tokens
online
Display the link onlineActivate survey
Set survey parameters (duration, invitation method)
Open survey
Choose invitation
method
[request link]
[request number of tokens]
Figure 9: Activity diagram for survey activation
UC05: Activate survey
Brief description: Organizer has decided to activate the survey. Organizer will set the
survey parameters (duration, invitation method). Survey parameters will be saved and
survey will be activated.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has created a survey. At least one question is added to the
survey. (Survey status is ’Draft’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to activate the survey. (Function activateSurvey)
Postcondition: Survey parameters are saved. (Survey will have status ’Active’)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to activate the survey.
2. System displays an editable form of survey parameters.
3. Organizer inserts survey parameters.
4. System asks for confirmation about activating the survey.
5. Organizer confirms his decision.
6. If the chosen invitation method is ’request link’, the system activates the survey and
displays the link to organizer online.
Extensions
3a. Organizer cancels activating the survey.
3a.1. System displays warning about changes not saved.
3a.2. Organizer decides to leave the page.
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3a.3. System cancels the process and displays the page organizer navigated to.
4a. System has detected validation errors and displays an error message.
4a.1. The use case continues from the main success scenario step 3.
6a. If the chosen invitation method is ’request number of tokens’, the system activates
the survey and displays the list of tokens to the organizer online.
UC06: Open survey
Brief description: The survey start time has come and the first participant has navigated
to the survey using the link. System will open the survey for participants.
Involved actors: Organizer, participant
Precondition: Organizer has activated the survey and survey start time has come. (Survey
status is ’Active’)
Trigger: Organizer or participant has navigated to the survey or organizer has required
to see the data. (Function openSurvey [startTimePassed AND surveyAccessed])
Postcondition: Survey is open to participants. (Survey will have status ’Open’)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Survey starting time has come and organizer has navigated to the survey or required
to see the data.
2. System opens survey for participants.
Extensions
1a. The survey starting time has come and the first participant has navigated to the
survey using the link.
1a.1. System opens survey for participants.
5.3 Run survey
This section describes the functionality available to organizer while survey is activated in
Figure 10.
Use cases that are describing this activity diagram:
• UC07: Change survey parameters/check survey status
• UC08: Cancel survey
• UC09: Close survey
• UC11: Deactivate survey.
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Organizer Survey system
Check survey status
Cancel
survey
Close survey Generate more tokens
Change survey parameters
(duration)
Display the list of additional
tokens online
Changes saved
Survey cancelled
Changes saved
Survey closed
Continue editing?
Additional tokens displayed
[No]
Continue editing?
[No]
Choose action
Figure 10: Activity diagram for running a survey
UC07: Change survey parameters/check survey status
Brief description: Organizer has activated the survey. While the survey is running, orga-
nizer can check survey status, change duration time or generate more tokens.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has activated the survey. (Survey status is ’Active’, ’Open’ or
’RespondingDeadlinePassed’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to change survey parameters or check survey status. (Func-
tion amendSurveyParameters)
Postcondition: Survey parameters are changed or survey status is displayed to organizer.
(Survey status will not change)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to change the survey parameters.
2. System displays an editable form.
3. Organizer changes the survey parameters.
4. System saves changes. If organizer has requested to generate more tokens system
displays the list of additional tokens to organizer online.
Extensions
1a. Organizer chooses to check the survey status.
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1a.1. System displays the survey status.
3a. Organizer decides to leave the page.
3a.1. System displays a warning about changes not saved.
3a.2. Organizer decides to leave the page.
3a.3. System displays the page that the organizer navigated to.
4a. System has detected validation errors and displays an error message.
4a.1. The use case continues from main success scenario step 3.
UC08: Cancel survey
Brief description: Organizer has created the survey, organizer can cancel the survey. Sur-
vey will be cancelled and all participant answers data will be deleted.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has created the survey. (Survey status is ’Draft’, ’Active’ or
’Open’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to cancel the survey. (Function cancelSurvey)
Postcondition: Survey is cancelled. (Survey will have status ’Cancelled’)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to cancel the survey.
2. System asks for confirmation about cancelling the survey.
3. Organizer confirms his/her decision.
4. System cancels the survey and deletes all participant answers data.
Extensions
3a. Organizer cancels cancelling the survey.
3a.1. System cancels the process.
UC09: Close survey
Brief description: Organizer has activated the survey. While the survey is running, or-
ganizer can close the survey before the duration has ended. Survey will be closed for
participants and all data will be preserved.
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: Organizer has activated the survey. (Survey status is ’Open’ or ’Respond-
ingDeadlinePassed’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to close the survey. (Function closeSurvey)
Postcondition: Survey is closed. (Survey will have status ’Closed’)
Security requirements: Access control
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to close the survey.
2. System asks for confirmation about closing the survey.
3. Organizer confirms his decision.
4. System closes the survey.
Extensions
3a. Organizer cancels closing the survey.
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3a.1. System cancels the process.
UC11: Deactivate survey
Brief description: The responding deadline for the survey has passed. System will deac-
tivate the survey.
Involved actors: Participant, organizer
Precondition: Survey is open for participants and survey responding deadline has passed.
(Survey status is ’Open’)
Trigger: Organizer or participant has navigated to the survey or organizer has required
to see the data. (Function deactivateSurvey [deadlinePassed AND surveyAccessed])
Postcondition: Survey is not open for participants (Survey will have status. ’Respond-
ingDeadlinePassed’)
Security requirements: Access control (if tokens are used or organizer is interacting with
the system)
Main success scenario
1. Survey responding deadline has passed and organizer has navigated to the survey or
required to see the data.
2. System deactivates the survey.
Extensions
1a. Survey responding deadline has passed and participant has navigated to the survey.
1a.1. System deactivates the survey.
5.4 Participate
This section describes the process of participating in a survey in Figure 11.
Use cases that are describing this activity diagram:
• UC10: Participate
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Participant Survey system
Use a link to navigate to
the survey
Add answers/edit before
submitting
Submit answers
See information about security
Create secret shares of
answers and store them
Cancel
participation
Con dentiality of
submitted data
Participation cancelled
<<con dential>>
Data securely stored
Choose action
Choose action
Choose action
Figure 11: Activity diagram for participating in a survey
UC10: Participate
Brief description: Organizer has activated the survey and the survey is open for partic-
ipants. Participant has received an invitation and navigated to first page of the survey.
Participant can fill in the questionnaire as well as check out the information about the
security guarantees. Participant will submit the answers and system will store the secret
shares of the answers in three different servers.
Involved actors: Participant
Precondition: Organizer has activated the survey. Participant has received an invitation.
The survey is open for participants. (Survey status is ’Open’)
Trigger: Participant decided to start answering the survey by navigating to first page of
the survey. (Function participate)
Postcondition: The secret shares of the survey data are securely stored in three different
servers. (Survey status will not change)
Security requirements: Access control (if tokens are used), data confidentiality
Main success scenario
1. Participant chooses to participate in the survey and uses the link to start answering
the questionnaire.
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2. System displays the first page of the survey.
3. Participant answers the questions and submits the answers.
4. System stores the secret shares of the answers in three different servers.
Extensions
3a. Participant requires to see information about security guarantees.
3a.1. System displays information about security guarantees.
3a.2. Participant is satisfied with the information and decides to continue answer-
ing questions.
3a.3. The use case continues from main success scenario step 2.
3b. Participant requires to see information about security guarantees.
3b.1. System displays information about security guarantees.
3b.2. Participant is not satisfied with the information and decides to terminate.
3b.3. System will not store any answers.
3c. Participant terminates from the survey.
3c.1. System will not store any answers.
5.5 Analyze
This section describes the process of analysing the outcome of the survey in Figure 12.
Use cases that are describing this activity diagram:
• UC12: Generate a report
• UC13: Publish/print report
• UC14: See published report
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Organizer Survey system Participant
See report
Print
Publish
report
Display the link online
Engage secure multi-party
computation protocols and
generate report
See published
report
Send the link to
participants
Con dentiality of the report
Con dentiality of
stored data
<<con dential>>
<<con dential>>
[survey closed]
Report displayed
Choose action
Choose action
Choose action
Figure 12: Activity diagram for analyzing the data
UC12: Generate a report
Brief description: The survey has been closed. System will compute the results using
secure multi-party computation, generate the report and make the report available to
organizer. Organizer can only see computed results and not the initial answers of partic-
ipants.
Involved actors: Survey system
Precondition: The survey has been closed. (Survey status is ’Closed’)
Trigger: The state of the survey shifts to ’Closed’. (Function generateReport)
Postcondition: Report is generated and available to organizer. (Survey will have status
’ResultsAvailable’)
Security requirements: Access control, data confidentiality
Main success scenario
1. The state of the survey shifts to ’Closed’.
2. System shifts the survey to the state ’Computing’, computes the results by using
secure multi-party computation.
3. System generates the report, shifts the survey to the state ’ResultsAvailable’ and
makes the report available to organizer.
Extensions
2a. Less than five participants have submitted answers.
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2a.1. System cancels the process and displays an explaining text.
UC13: Publish/print report
Brief description: System has generated a report and organizer can choose to print and/or
publish it. When published, the report will be accessible for participants only through a
special link (this functionality has not been completely implemented in the prototype by
the time of submitting the thesis).
Involved actors: Organizer
Precondition: The report has been generated. (Survey status is ’ResultsAvailable’)
Trigger: Organizer decided to print/publish the report. (Function publishReport)
Postcondition: Report is published/ready for printing. (Survey will have status ’Result-
sPublished’)
Security requirements: Access control, data confidentiality
Main success scenario
1. Organizer chooses to print the report.
2. System displays the print view of the report to organizer.
3. Organizer prints the report.
Extensions
1a. Organizer chooses to publish the report and the invitation method was ’request link’
or ’request number of tokens’.
1a.1. System publishes the report and generates a link for published report. Sys-
tem displays the link to organizer online.
1a.2. Organizer sends the link to participants.
UC14: See published report
Brief description: Organizer has published the report. Participant has received the link
and navigated to the report view (this functionality has not been completely implemented
in the prototype by the time of submitting the thesis).
Involved actors: Participant
Precondition: Organizer has published the report. Participant has received the link. (Sur-
vey status is ’ResultsPublished’)
Trigger: Participant decided to view the report by navigating to the report view.
Postcondition: The report is displayed to participant. (Survey status will not change)
Security requirements: Access control, data confidentiality
Main success scenario
1. Participant chooses to view the report and uses the link to display it.
2. System displays the report.
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5.6 State machine diagram
To further provide an overview of the system the state machine is provided in Figure 13.
entry / generateLink [invitationMethod = 1] OR
generateTokens [invitationMethod = 2]
entry / generateReport
RespondingDeadlinePassed
Closed
Active
Computing
ResultsAvailable
Open
Draft
deactivateSurvey [deadlinePassed
AND surveyAccessed]
amendSurveyParameters
[durationExtended]
cancelSurvey
closeSurvey
createSurvey
amendSurveyParameters
activateSurvey
amendSurveyParameters
closeSurvey
amendQuestionnaire
participate
openSurvey [startTimePassed AND surveyAccessed]
generateReport
finishComputing
publishResults /
generateLink [invitationMethod = 1 OR 2]
Figure 13: Survey system state machine diagram
38
6 Design of the secure survey system
The secure survey system consists of two main components: client software and server
software (see Figures 14 and 15). The client software is a web application for a general
web browser. Browser based web applications are built in HTML, CSS and JavaScript.
The web application is deployed to the user over the internet. When requested by the
user, the browser contacts the server, downloads the web application, and runs it. This
process eliminates any need for installing custom software on the user’s computer and
can easily complete within a second without affecting the user experience.
The server side software of Sharemind is distributed (duplicated) across three servers.
Each server software instance runs on different cloud providers’ virtual machines using
Linux as an operating system and is maintained by different PRACTICE partners so one
single partner nor one single cloud service provider can gain access to all secret shares
of participants’ answers and hereby compromise the confidentiality of the secret-shared
values.
Public data is stored in plain text form and in case of private data, the shares of data are
stored. The secret shares of participants’ answers can not be reconstructed by the server
host, any of the involved cloud service providers nor by the survey organizer. To be able
to reconstruct secret shares of the answers, a single party should know all the shares of
data. As none of them control all of the servers, they do not have all of the shares and
therefore can not reconstruct the answer data.
The secret shares of participants’ answers are moved to the server over a secure chan-
nel and thereby also protected against eavesdropping. The result of a survey can be
reconstructed only by the survey organizer and the organizer may then allow others to
reconstruct the results e.g. the participants or the general public. Only organizer can
reconstruct survey analysis results, because server checks if organizer is authenticated
and only then sends secret shares of the results to the organizer browser, which then
reconstructs the results and shows them to the organizer.
Web Browser
Sharemind server 1 Sharemind server 2 Sharemind server 3
Sharemind
VM
Sharemind
VM
Sharemind
VM
HTML/JS web
application
Figure 14: The simplified deployment diagram of secure survey system
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Figure 15: The deployment model of secure survey system
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7 Aspects of analyzing and deploying SMC-based sys-
tems
7.1 Introduction
The author of this paper has an experience in analyzing the business processes of two
prototypes that are based on secure multi-party computation. The first one is the secure
survey system prototype that is described in this master’s thesis. The second one is the
prototype of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board (MTA) value-added tax (VAT) fraud
detection system [16].
According to the law that came into force in December 2014, Estonian companies must
report transactions with each partner with whom the monthly sum of transactions ex-
ceeds 1000 euros. MTA detects tax fraud by analyzing the financial records of the suspect
company and its partners to determine the actual taxable sum. The system runs risk
analysis algorithms to find cases where a company has incorrectly declared transactions
(or not declared them at all).
The Estonian Traders association was concerned about the security of the "super database"
of financial transactions. Moreover, as MTA has a significant employee turnover, a tax
officer could copy the database to support his or her future business ambitions in the pri-
vate sector. Agreeing with the significant privacy risk, the President of Estonia blocked
the legislation at first [9].
Examining the problem, we saw the secure multi-party computation as a solution. We
designed a prototype with a reduced scope that conducts the risk analysis while the trans-
actions are in the encrypted domain. Only the risk scores will be published to the tax
officer who can then request the detailed records for the at-risk companies. This protects
the information and rights of the honest taxpayers, as their declaration annexes remain
encrypted during the whole process.
This section describes how the business processes and the deployment of the systems that
are based on secure multi-party computation are different from the usual solutions.
7.2 Case 1: a privacy-preserving survey system
The secure survey system is an example of a privacy-preserving cloud service that is
based on secure multi-party computation. The business processes of the system are not
remarkably different from the processes that would be implemented in a non-SMC system.
Users’ behaviour in the system is not affected by the fact that the data is secret-shared
at the source and SMC is used for computing the results.
The difference is noticeable when we take a look at the architecture of the system. In-
stead of storing data in one server, the system is distributed across three servers and
secret shares of the data are each stored in different server. This requires that each server
is hosted by a different company who has capability to host the computing instance and
also has no intentions to collude with other parties.
41
The positive side of the distributed system is that it significantly rises the level of the
privacy of the system. The answer data of participants remains confidential at all times
even during report preparation. The new trust model gives the participants a guarantee
that their sensitive data remains confidential and encourages participants to give truthful
answers.
7.3 Case 2: a privacy-preserving VAT fraud detection system
The Estonian Tax and Customs Board (MTA) value-added tax (VAT) fraud detection
system is an example of a privacy-preserving software that processes highly confidential
data. Similarly to the secure survey prototype, the business processes of the VAT fraud
detection system are not different from the processes that are implemented in a non-SMC
system and there are no changes in users’ behaviour.
The changes had to be made in the architecture of the system and data was stored in
three servers instead of one. However, the risk analysts of MTA were concerned with
the required transparency. Today, MTA can perform risk analyses autonomously so that
unauthorized parties have no knowledge of the kind of algorithms that are used. SMC
would change this and MTA would have to agree on the algorithms with other hosts.
Based on the calculations from MTA, 80 000 companies will upload 50 million economic
transactions every month. We estimated that our prototype can process one month of
Estonian economy in ten days, using about 20 000 euros worth of hardware. This was met
with some concern, as today, MTA processes VAT returns in three days. Nevertheless,
MTA agreed to consider SMC as a technology for confidential data collection and analysis
in future application, inspired by our prediction that the cost of deploying SMC will be
further reduced in the coming years.
7.4 Key differences in the deployment of SMC-based software
compared to the usual solutions
This subsection describes the key differences in the deployment of SMC-based software
compared to the non-SMC solutions.
• Using SMC based on secret sharing, the architecture of the system has to be
changed. Instead of storing data in one server the system is distributed across
multiple servers to maintain the security guarantees of secret sharing.
• The distributed nature of the system increases the complexity of the maintenance
and, also, administrative costs.
• Each server has to be hosted by a different company who has capability to host the
computing instance and, also, has no intentions to collude with other parties.
• In the systems that deal with a large amount of data the computing process is
significantly slower for a practical use with today’s SMC techniques.
• If the analysis algorithms are confidential it is hard to hide the algorithms from other
computing parties as all hosts would need to agree to the risk analysis algorithms.
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• The use of SMC significantly rises the level of the confidentiality of the data. It
protects the data from unauthorized access by both insiders and outside attackers.
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis we describe the analysis and design of the secure survey prototype that
is based on secure multi-party computation. The main goal was to implement a survey
system that allows researchers to collect sensitive data without compromising the privacy
of participants. This paper introduces the business processes as well as the design of the
prototype of the secure survey system.
To communicate the business processes of the system, the author has modelled the ac-
tivity diagrams using Unified Modelling Language (UML). In addition, there are the use
cases and the state machine diagram used, to give a more detailed description of the
system. The secure survey system prototype is designed to run on two different secure
multi-party computation engines: Sharemind and Fresco/SPDZ. This master’s thesis
concentrates on the implementation using the Sharemind 3 framework.
Using SMC allows us to build applications that are used for collecting and analyzing
confidential data. The privacy preservation techniques, like secret-sharing of the data,
distributing the system across three different servers, setting the minimum number of
answers required for each question and public data checks, are used to accomplish the
level of security that corresponds to the actors’ needs.
The design of the secure survey prototype is also introduced in this thesis. The system
consists of two main components: client software and server software. The client software
is a web application for a general web browser. The server side software of Sharemind
is distributed across three servers. Each server software instance runs on different cloud
providers’ virtual machines and is maintained by different PRACTICE partners.
In addition to the secure survey prototype, the author of this thesis has an experience in
analyzing the business processes of another prototype that is based on secure multi-party
computation – the prototype of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board (MTA) value-added
tax (VAT) fraud detection system. Based on the experience, there are the key differences
in the deployment of SMC-based software compared to the usual solutions introduced in
Section 7.
For example, the architecture of the system has to be changed irrespective of whether we
deal with small or large amount of data. In addition, when the system is required to hand-
le a large amount of data, there might be problems with the performance of computing
the results. However, the use of SMC significantly rises the level of the confidentiality
of the data and protects the data from unauthorized access by both insiders and outside
attackers.
8.1 Future work
As a future work, the functionality of the secure survey system could be improved, for
example, by adding functionalities like template system (possibility to copy existing sur-
vey or question), e-mail template design system, user creation system, etc. For building
trust with participants, there could be added a possibility for organizer to upload his/her
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company’s logo and contact information on the survey template. For participants there
could be added a possibility to preview how the final report would look like.
The prototype will probably be used to run real surveys in the near future – an employee
satisfaction survey of city government of Tartu, a survey on "correct use of standards"
within H2020 project, surveys within the Alexandra Institute and PRACTICE survey on
security issues.
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